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Friedrich and Vera Lutz’s recent book on The Theory of Investment of the Firm I is an 
attempt, and within its self-imposed limits a highly successful attempt, to apply the 
marginal analysis-that is, the theory of profit maximization-to the problem of 
the time and capital dimensions of the behavior of the firm. It has long been re- 
garded as a weakness of the conventional marginal analysis that it neglects the 
capital and time structure of the firm, and bases its conclusions on the assumed 
maximization of a supposedly continuous flow of net revenue. Dr. and Mrs. Lutz 
have made a determined effort to overcome this defect, by applying the theory of 
maximization to the variables of the firm as they are spread out in time. There is 
nothing particularly new in this approach-it has been foreshadowed by Wick- 
sell, Bohm-Bawerk, and developed in modern economics by Hicks, Hart, and 
many others. In this book however it has been carried to a degree of completeness 
which leaves the impression that there is practically nowhere else to go on this 
particular road. As an exercise in the marginal analysis this work might properly 
claim to be exhaustive, and if the reader occasionally finds it exhausting, he can 
at  least thank the authors for having pursued one road of inquiry practically to 
the end. 
After a brief glance a t  the nature of time reIationships in a productive process 
the authors proceed to a very thorough discussion, in chapter 11, of four possible 
criteria of profit maximization. It is a little astonishing that at  this late date in the 
development of the theory of maximization it is not wholly clear exactly what is 
to be maximized. The four criteria discussed are (i) the present value offuture net 
receipts, discounted at market rates of interest; (ii) the ratio of discounted receipts 
to discounted costs; (iii) the internal rate of return; (iv) the rate of return on the 
entrepreneur’s own capital. The second can be dismissed as having merely his- 
torical significance. The fourth is apparently regarded as the true criterion, with 
which the first almost always coincides. The third coincides with the others only 
in the highly special case ofperfect capital markets and a no-rent enterprise where 
the internal rate of return and the market rate of interest are identical. The re- 
mainder of the work is largely an exercise in the development of the consequences 
of maximizing discounted net receipts in a great variety of circumstances, plus 
some tantalizingly brief comments or some broader themes, such as the accelera- 
tion principle (on which the analysis casts considerable doubt), the so-called “Ri- 
cardo effect” of a general rise in wages, the distinction between capital and in- 
come, and the theory of interest. 
It is impossible in a short Note even to outline the richness and complexity of 
the analysis. For those who are interested in the marginal analysis and in capital 
theory the book is required reading, and the more general economist will not find 
much in it to cause him to revise his previous views. I n  an attempt to assess the 
importance of the work in the development of economic thought it is almost more 
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important to notice what is not in it than what is in it. This is true of all books like 
this, which represent the culmination of a very special line of thought. The better 
the book the more important it is to raise the awkward and disagreeable question 
of whether the line of thought itself is a valid and useful one. When any line of 
thought is pursued to the end the question must be raised as to whether the end is 
a dead end; are all the significant questions answered, and if not, where are the 
roads that lead beyond the blind alley? 
The very excellence and completeness of the work under re\ iew, therefore, 
makes the question all the more important as to the usefulness of the method em- 
ployed. Does this elaborate analysis of maximization through time actually teach 
us very much about the real behavior of firms, and does it even give us a standard 
by which that behavior may be judged? The theory of profit maximization has 
rarely claimed to be a description of what firms actually do, and the present au- 
thors make no such claim. There is indeed a social-psychological theory of the 
firm, as a special case of the theory of organization, which discusses decisions in 
terms of the information which the executive receives, the dynamic patterns ac- 
cording to which information received by the executive becomes information or 
order sent out by him, the learning process by which past experience modifies the 
behavior reactions, the crisis-adjustment or stimulus-response patterns, the “feed 
back” by which a comparison of intentions with the information about results 
modifies policy, and so on. Economics has made very little contribution to this 
theory, nevertheless it is of vital importance in assessing the significance of the 
marginal analysis. Any claim on the part of the marginal analysis to be “realistic” 
-that is, to be a model which is helpful in understanding actual human behav- 
ior-an be defended only on the ground that behavior which diverges from that 
prescribed by the marginal analysis will result in two things: one, information 
regarding this divergence, and the other, action to lessen the divergence. 
Unfortunately strong objections can be made to the marginal analysis on both 
these points. There is very little in the information system of a firm which informs 
the executive when he is not maximizing whatever he is supposed to be maxi- 
mizing. This means that the maximum profit position, even supposing that the 
executive wanted to maximize profits, cannot be regarded as an equilibrium posi- 
tion in the proper sense, because if the entrepreneur is not informed about depar- 
tures from the maximum there is obviously no force operating to bring him back 
to it if he diverges from it. It may properly be replied to this objection that gross 
departures from the maximum profit position do become obvious to the entre- 
preneur, and that hence there is at least a range of positions around the optimum 
which can be regarded as an equilibrium “range”, in the sense that positions out- 
side this range will result in information which will move the firm within the 
range again. It can also be said that the more skilled the entrepreneur becomes, 
the narrower will this equilibrium range be, and the closer will his behavior ap- 
proximate to that required by the marginal analysis. These replies at  least rescue 
the marginal analysis from those who would dispense with it altogether: it remains 
as an important limiting case of the more general theory of behavior. 
There is, however, an objection to the principle of profit maximization which is 
perhaps even more destructive than the attacks on its “realism”, and which is of 
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particular importance in the applications of the maximization principle to the 
capital and time structure. This is the objection that even if the entrepreneur 
knew how to maximize profits there are many reasons why it would not be rational 
for him to do so. This argument, that is to say, denounces the principle of profit 
maximization as not merely unrealistic, but non-normative. There are two main 
reasons why a policy of profit maximization might not be ideal. The first is that it 
assumes that assets can be valued on a linear scale in terms of dollars, in the sense 
that a greater dollar value is always prefered to a smaller at the same time, and I 
suppose one should add, place. In fact however the structure and composition of 
assets may be highly significant in rational choice, and it may be impossible to 
range the possible clusters of assets on a simple linear scale. That is to say, there 
may be rational grounds for prefering one of two clusters of assets to another, even 
though the two have the same dollar value, because of some difference in compo- 
sition-in say, liquidity, or flexibility, or even aesthetic qualities. The items of a 
balance sheet, that is to say, have something of the qualities of a gestalt which can- 
not be reduced to a linear scale. Indeed, the only circumstances under which it 
might reasonably be assumed that the entrepreneur was indifferent to the form of 
his asset cluster is the situation in which all assets (positive and negative) can be 
exchanged for all other assets at constant rates of transformation-that is, in 
which there are perfect markets for all assets. The moment imperfect markets for 
any asset (or liability) are introduced we can no longer assume that the entre- 
preneur is indifferent to the form of his asset cluster, and hence the principle of 
profit maximization itself falls to the ground, as the entrepreneur might, for in- 
stance, prefer a cluster of smaller dollar value, but in which the items were less 
exposed to imperfection in markets, to a cluster of greater dollar value in which 
the items were so exposed. The principle of profit maximization was first devel- 
oped under the assumption of perfect markets, and it is still not generally realised 
how damaging to the principle itself is the extension of the marginal analysis to 
cover the case of the imperfect market. 
The second objection to the profit maximization principle is closely related to 
the first, and is that it cannot adequately take account of the phenomena of un- 
certainty. The usual method of dealing with uncertainty in the theory of profit 
maximization is to replace the uncertain future magnitudes of revenues, outlays, or 
capital values with certainty equivalents derived from the assumed probability of the 
future magnitudes, and from the evaluation of risk itself on the part of the entre- 
preneur. That is to say we ask the entrepreneur, in effect: you hope for a dollar 
next year, but you are not quite sure of getting it: would eighty cents that you 
were absolutely sure of getting seem just as good to you as the dollar you are not 
sure about? If he says “yes”, we simply substitute the eighty cents which is the 
“certainty equivalent” for the uncertain dollar, and proceed with our analysis as 
if nothing had happened and uncertainty were eliminated. Unfortunately, as 
Albert Hart has pointed out, this procedure completely begs the question. The 
whole problem is the effect of uncertainty itself on the behavior of the entrepre- 
neur-what measures does he take to escape from it, to guard against it, and to 
protect himselffrom its consequences? I t  is no answer to this criticism, as Dr. and 
Mrs. Lutz seem to think (p. 183), to say that we can estimate the probabilities of 
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the probabilities and still come out with certainty equivalents, because the pres- 
ence of uncertainty modifies profoundly the form of the “rational” asset struc- 
ture, distorting it away from “lucrativity” towards liquidity and flexibility. Here 
the principle of the minimax developed in the theory of games (making the best 
of the worst!) seems to be more applicable than the principle of maximization. 
This basic defect in the principle of profit maximization itself seems to this 
writer to vitiate much of the most original part of the Lutz’s work, where they 
apply the profit maximization principle to such problems as the cash balance and 
the financial structure. In brief, the Lutz’s method is to identify (quite properly) 
the history of a firm with the history of its complete balance sheet, including cash 
balances, physical assets, debts and equities, and then to say that out of all pos- 
sible histories that one will be chosen for which the present value of the “true” net 
worth (discounted net receipts) is a maximum. This procedure however rules out 
what is in practice one of the most interesting aspects of the theory of investment 
in the firm, which is the circumstances under which lucrativity (or net worth) is 
sacrificed for other things (security, control, respectability, and so on). 
The defect of the method comes out especially clearly in the theory of the cash 
balance, and of liquid assets in general. We cannot explain as the Lutz’s seem to 
try to do, the holding of cash balances in terms of the transactions motive and the 
speculative motive alone, though it is certainly true, as they point out, that these 
two motives cannot readily be separated. The “precautionary motive”-that is, 
the holding of assets in liquid form against unknown contingencies-is of great 
importance in explaining preferences for liquid assets, yet this cannot really be 
worked into any scheme of profit maximization except by the very unsatisfactory 
device of saying that long-run experience gives rise to certain rules of thumb 
which people believe are in the interests of long-run profit maximization. This 
device however merely obscures the real problem, which is that an increase in 
liquidity involves a sucrifice of expected profit in the interest offlexibility-flexibili- 
ty being the ability to cope with the unexpected! This principle is particularly clear 
in the case of the theory of a bank, where the profit maximization principle has 
never been applied, and where the theorist has always relied on asset preference 
functions or parameters such as the reserve ratio to explain the bank‘s behavior. 
All this does not necessarily mean that the principle of maximization must be 
abandoned. Even if we have to abandon the assumption that the firm maximizes 
any “objective” measure of profit, it still makes some kind of sense to assume that 
the firm maximizes “utility”-that is, that there is a preference function the topo- 
logy of which can be discussed and which determines (or perhaps it would be bet- 
ter to say describes) which, out of the range of possible choices, is the “best”. The 
assumption of a preference function in fact effects a great simplification in the 
theory of the firm, for we can throw all the future into the preference function and 
regard the action of the firm as taking place wholly in the present. The firm can 
then be thought of as manipulating its asset structure, through exchange or pro- 
duction, up to the point at which further transformations are not thought “worth 
while” that is, the point at which all marginal rates of transformation are equal to 
marginal rates of indifferent substitution. We can then discuss the formation of 
the preference function in terms of the effects of past experiences, and so develop 
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a true dynamics of the firm which sidesteps the whole difficult matter of explicit 
formulation of expectations. 
I have been critical of the foundations on which the Lutz’s work has been rais- 
ed. My criticism of the foundations in no way implies criticism of the elegance and 
completeness of the structure. I do believe-to vary the metaphor-that the road 
which they have taken is in fact a blind alley. It is a great service to the profession 
however to explore even a blind alley to its fullest extent, for we can never be sure 
there is no way out of it until it has been fully explored. For this reason economists 
must be grateful to the Lutz’s for the careful and thorough way in which they have 
followed their task through. 
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